Post-Mortem of Labour's Defeat
Following the General Election, Labour is in
disarray. While it eats itself alive, I am thinking about how it
became unelectable and whether this was avoidable?
If we listen to the crashes and bangs of the current row, two distinct arguments can be heard. On the one side we have the Corbynistas, who claim Brexit decided the result; and on the other we have the Remainers, who claim Corbyn decided the result. Who is right? I think we have to see behind the shouting match.
Taking Corbyn first, in my view it is obvious he contributed to the defeat. He is the public face of the Labour Party. His persona is what people associate with the party. You can make the same case for Johnson and the Tories. Corbynism reached its peak after the General Election 2017. His popularity has been on the decline ever since. He entered the 2019 election with horrendous personal ratings. Multiple polls back up this assertion. Given that his popularity was undeniably poor, the question becomes more about what he did to rectify this state of affairs.
Even before the campaign had begun he was interviewed by Andrew Marr, just before the conference, and performed badly. It was an opportunity to set the tone. Instead, he was defensive and bad-tempered, cementing his reputation for peevishness. His personal nadir came with the Andrew Neil interview. It was a drubbing that marked the point of no return. His personal ratings flatlined and his media performances continued to be sporadic, dull and lifeless. He had, in my view, a responsibility to do better. If he knew he could not do better, he should have been honest about this and admit that he was not up to the job. Unfortunately, he tacked the other way and became ever more defensive. His support was in the end limited to his core followers. Most people viewed him as a liability.
It can of course be argued that the entire phalanx of billionaire papers, the BBC and even, on occasion, centrist papers like the Guardian, were against him. Levels of anti-Corbyn reporting were at exceptional levels according to research at Loughborough University (see Independent report), especially during the last few days of the campaign. However, he and his team must have known this was coming. Their preparedness for the onslaught was dismal. He was most certainly the wrong front man. I will defer to Fintan O'Toole on how a series of accidents installed him as leader. How he was originally a token leftist; how a change in the rules led to unforeseen consequences; how a man with no ambition ascended to a role where ambition is a prerequisite. The article can be found behind a pay wall in the Irish Times. Suffice to say, Corbyn was never the best candidate to lead the party.
What happened next was that he, probably under orders from his advisors, took full control of the party machine. Seumus Milne, director of strategy and communications, is likely to have been a key player. Within that inner core a preference for authoritarian control resulted in, ridiculously, some MPs facing trigger ballots while they were preparing to fight the election. They tended not to be the sort of MPs who shared the ideology of Milne, McCluskey, Murphy and Murray (the "four Ms" as they are sometimes called). Needless to say, with so much attention facing inwards, the outward threat of an extreme right-wing government, was not given proper focus. Corbyn and his team failed to grab the headlines other than briefly for the launch of the ill-fated broadband proposal. Instead, the team was content to wait for mistakes. When they happened they then failed to capitalise on them. The Tories managed to exert an almost unbroken control over the news agenda even though their own campaign was, by any normal standards, an ugly debasement of politics. How Labour failed to find anything to counter what even some Tories were finding hard to stomach, tells us how bad Labour's campaign was. Most notably, Labour failed to counter the claim by Johnson that Brexit was "oven ready" and it was time to "get Brexit done". More on this later but both statements are demonstrably false. One of the most depressing outcomes of the dysfunctional leadership was that talented communicators, most notably Kier Starmer, were sidelined. The team would rather have them say nothing than have them say something people might like.
Unfortunately, incompetence and internal squabbling were not the only things wrong with Labour during the election. It was dogged throughout by accusations of anti-Semitism, which the Tories exploited ruthlessly. At its heart, Labour was conflicted on what should have been a very straightforward matter. Anti-Semitism should have been stamped out summarily. Instead, it was allowed to drag on, causing enormous damage. Why was this?
The underlying beliefs are complex but seem to relate to how some Labour members and some key personnel cannot rid themselves of the suspicion that Jews are part of a global conspiracy. It ties in with a belief that capitalism is a tyranny that must be resisted in the name of socialism. A common trope, for example, is the Rothchild family, who are associated with banking and are Jewish. It is one thing to suggest banking exerts an invisible influence over our affairs, which it almost certainly does, and quite another to relate this idea to the Jewish ownership of banks. The IHRA provide clear guidelines to help avoid such pitfalls. It should have been an obvious move to accept them in full but Corbyn decided to question them. In footballing terms it was one hell of an unforced error. Quite apart from the message this must have sent to the Jewish community, it illustrated an almost total lack of political nous. It certainly did nothing to assuage fears he was not the man to lead the country. He subsequently doubled down on this blunder by refusing to take decisive action within his party. Then, quite bizarrely, he refused several times to apologise for any harm his party may have caused. There is no doubt he lost many votes over his handling of anti-Semitism, quite unnecessarily.
However much other issues played a part, Brexit was the monster no-one could avoid. Unfortunately, Labour did just that. The painful history of avoidance can be tracked back to the beginnings of Brexit, where on a different campaign trail Corbyn could only award 7 out of 10 for the cause he was supporting. He did a poor job of disguising his antipathy for the EU. Welcome to the world of Lexit. Although Corbyn has never formerly stated his position, it is reasonable to assume from his actions (and inactions) that he is on the side of Lexit. So are his advisors. The belief is misguided. Many members of the EU exert a degree of state control which makes possible all the things a socialist government could reasonably want. Nonetheless, the view that the EU is a capitalist empire to be vanquished runs deep within the leadership. The membership and MPs generally hold much more positive views. This misalignment is the explanation for the main chunk of what went wrong in the election.
Any position that was definite would have been better than the what Labour proposed. It could have developed a coherent, soft Brexit position or it could have gone full Remain. In either case there would have been an easy selling point. Instead, it arrived at the most contorted position possible; of a non-defined Brexit followed by a referendum. To compound the lack of clarity, Corbyn then proposed he would take no position himself. A laughable abdication of responsibility. The worst of all possible worlds. It was crucial in several ways.
Before the election there were opportunities to get rid of Johnson's failing regime. It is painful to recall how utterly shambolic it was and how badly it was jammed in a corner. With Johnson desperate for an election, the opposition needed to unite against him. The obstacle was the convening of a government of national unity (GNU). It was clear from the beginning this was beyond the grasp of the limited politicians involved. The leader of the Lib Dems can step forward here for her share of the blame. Rarely has a political career been so short lived or so destructive. In her zeal to prove her right-wing credentials Swinson dismissed Corbyn out of hand. All Corbyn had to do to ensure his Lexit remained on the table was to do nothing, a tactic he had fully mastered. The ensuing debate on who could lead a GNU in his place was guaranteed to vaporise on first contact with the "rebel alliance". With one or two notable exceptions this alliance was built from a motley crew of selfish and dimwitted MPs. The only possibility of a successful GNU was for the largest party in opposition to lead it with popular support. On reflection, this was never going to happen. Even the date of the election was conceded to the Tories.
We then reach the last furlong. I believe too much damage had been done through incompetence and internal wrangling to expect a Labour victory. A hung Parliament was just about possible though. It depended on campaigning successfully on the biggest issue of the past forty years. The lines of attack were obvious. Johnson had failed to deliver Brexit by the 31 October. He had cobbled together a very bad withdrawal agreement for political reasons only. His "get Brexit done" slogan was obviously bogus. Surely Labour could make headway?
Labour did not even try. The leadership were, in my opinion, so committed to Lexit that to argue against the Tories would have risked compromising the outcome they secretly desired. They tried to use the NHS to deflect attention. Even this strategy was lacklustre. The threat of US bullying on drugs prices should have been a rallying cry. It turned into another damp squib. However unfair, the press and the BBC were always going to side with Johnson. Labour had to be especially good to counter this inherent bias. The fact that Labour were the opposite of especially good is the reason that no argument they attempted was ever likely to shift the momentum, which was with Johnson. His performances were irksome and clumsy but were still enough to defeat Labour. What is the explanation?
Broadly speaking, the internal divisions within Labour - between the old guard who believed in a hard-left form of socialism and the more progressive, pro-European contingent - led to paralysis. Both message and policy were compromised. For Labour to have done better it would have needed to have provided a compelling narrative that energised every level of the party. A more coherent campaign would have emerged. Patently, this was not the case. In particular, Labour failed in its northern heartlands. Its message on Brexit was so garbled it was not believed by Leavers, who saw Johnson as the pathfinder, nor by Remainers. It was impossible to explain because it made no sense. A clear position, one way or the other, would surely have done better.
It boils down to a more significant question. What is Labour for? If it is not able to articulate this because it has not convinced itself, it is hardly surprising that voters will not be convinced either. Implicit in the Lexit argument is a desire for state intervention. If a party displays its competence by inflicting serious damage on itself by not dealing with anti-Semitism, by concocting an impossible Brexit policy and by failing to oppose a dangerous and deranged right-wing government, people will suspect the same level of competence in terms of state intervention. Voters are not stupid. Unfortunately, by and large, the Labour Party has been.
If we listen to the crashes and bangs of the current row, two distinct arguments can be heard. On the one side we have the Corbynistas, who claim Brexit decided the result; and on the other we have the Remainers, who claim Corbyn decided the result. Who is right? I think we have to see behind the shouting match.
Taking Corbyn first, in my view it is obvious he contributed to the defeat. He is the public face of the Labour Party. His persona is what people associate with the party. You can make the same case for Johnson and the Tories. Corbynism reached its peak after the General Election 2017. His popularity has been on the decline ever since. He entered the 2019 election with horrendous personal ratings. Multiple polls back up this assertion. Given that his popularity was undeniably poor, the question becomes more about what he did to rectify this state of affairs.
Even before the campaign had begun he was interviewed by Andrew Marr, just before the conference, and performed badly. It was an opportunity to set the tone. Instead, he was defensive and bad-tempered, cementing his reputation for peevishness. His personal nadir came with the Andrew Neil interview. It was a drubbing that marked the point of no return. His personal ratings flatlined and his media performances continued to be sporadic, dull and lifeless. He had, in my view, a responsibility to do better. If he knew he could not do better, he should have been honest about this and admit that he was not up to the job. Unfortunately, he tacked the other way and became ever more defensive. His support was in the end limited to his core followers. Most people viewed him as a liability.
It can of course be argued that the entire phalanx of billionaire papers, the BBC and even, on occasion, centrist papers like the Guardian, were against him. Levels of anti-Corbyn reporting were at exceptional levels according to research at Loughborough University (see Independent report), especially during the last few days of the campaign. However, he and his team must have known this was coming. Their preparedness for the onslaught was dismal. He was most certainly the wrong front man. I will defer to Fintan O'Toole on how a series of accidents installed him as leader. How he was originally a token leftist; how a change in the rules led to unforeseen consequences; how a man with no ambition ascended to a role where ambition is a prerequisite. The article can be found behind a pay wall in the Irish Times. Suffice to say, Corbyn was never the best candidate to lead the party.
What happened next was that he, probably under orders from his advisors, took full control of the party machine. Seumus Milne, director of strategy and communications, is likely to have been a key player. Within that inner core a preference for authoritarian control resulted in, ridiculously, some MPs facing trigger ballots while they were preparing to fight the election. They tended not to be the sort of MPs who shared the ideology of Milne, McCluskey, Murphy and Murray (the "four Ms" as they are sometimes called). Needless to say, with so much attention facing inwards, the outward threat of an extreme right-wing government, was not given proper focus. Corbyn and his team failed to grab the headlines other than briefly for the launch of the ill-fated broadband proposal. Instead, the team was content to wait for mistakes. When they happened they then failed to capitalise on them. The Tories managed to exert an almost unbroken control over the news agenda even though their own campaign was, by any normal standards, an ugly debasement of politics. How Labour failed to find anything to counter what even some Tories were finding hard to stomach, tells us how bad Labour's campaign was. Most notably, Labour failed to counter the claim by Johnson that Brexit was "oven ready" and it was time to "get Brexit done". More on this later but both statements are demonstrably false. One of the most depressing outcomes of the dysfunctional leadership was that talented communicators, most notably Kier Starmer, were sidelined. The team would rather have them say nothing than have them say something people might like.
Unfortunately, incompetence and internal squabbling were not the only things wrong with Labour during the election. It was dogged throughout by accusations of anti-Semitism, which the Tories exploited ruthlessly. At its heart, Labour was conflicted on what should have been a very straightforward matter. Anti-Semitism should have been stamped out summarily. Instead, it was allowed to drag on, causing enormous damage. Why was this?
The underlying beliefs are complex but seem to relate to how some Labour members and some key personnel cannot rid themselves of the suspicion that Jews are part of a global conspiracy. It ties in with a belief that capitalism is a tyranny that must be resisted in the name of socialism. A common trope, for example, is the Rothchild family, who are associated with banking and are Jewish. It is one thing to suggest banking exerts an invisible influence over our affairs, which it almost certainly does, and quite another to relate this idea to the Jewish ownership of banks. The IHRA provide clear guidelines to help avoid such pitfalls. It should have been an obvious move to accept them in full but Corbyn decided to question them. In footballing terms it was one hell of an unforced error. Quite apart from the message this must have sent to the Jewish community, it illustrated an almost total lack of political nous. It certainly did nothing to assuage fears he was not the man to lead the country. He subsequently doubled down on this blunder by refusing to take decisive action within his party. Then, quite bizarrely, he refused several times to apologise for any harm his party may have caused. There is no doubt he lost many votes over his handling of anti-Semitism, quite unnecessarily.
However much other issues played a part, Brexit was the monster no-one could avoid. Unfortunately, Labour did just that. The painful history of avoidance can be tracked back to the beginnings of Brexit, where on a different campaign trail Corbyn could only award 7 out of 10 for the cause he was supporting. He did a poor job of disguising his antipathy for the EU. Welcome to the world of Lexit. Although Corbyn has never formerly stated his position, it is reasonable to assume from his actions (and inactions) that he is on the side of Lexit. So are his advisors. The belief is misguided. Many members of the EU exert a degree of state control which makes possible all the things a socialist government could reasonably want. Nonetheless, the view that the EU is a capitalist empire to be vanquished runs deep within the leadership. The membership and MPs generally hold much more positive views. This misalignment is the explanation for the main chunk of what went wrong in the election.
Any position that was definite would have been better than the what Labour proposed. It could have developed a coherent, soft Brexit position or it could have gone full Remain. In either case there would have been an easy selling point. Instead, it arrived at the most contorted position possible; of a non-defined Brexit followed by a referendum. To compound the lack of clarity, Corbyn then proposed he would take no position himself. A laughable abdication of responsibility. The worst of all possible worlds. It was crucial in several ways.
Before the election there were opportunities to get rid of Johnson's failing regime. It is painful to recall how utterly shambolic it was and how badly it was jammed in a corner. With Johnson desperate for an election, the opposition needed to unite against him. The obstacle was the convening of a government of national unity (GNU). It was clear from the beginning this was beyond the grasp of the limited politicians involved. The leader of the Lib Dems can step forward here for her share of the blame. Rarely has a political career been so short lived or so destructive. In her zeal to prove her right-wing credentials Swinson dismissed Corbyn out of hand. All Corbyn had to do to ensure his Lexit remained on the table was to do nothing, a tactic he had fully mastered. The ensuing debate on who could lead a GNU in his place was guaranteed to vaporise on first contact with the "rebel alliance". With one or two notable exceptions this alliance was built from a motley crew of selfish and dimwitted MPs. The only possibility of a successful GNU was for the largest party in opposition to lead it with popular support. On reflection, this was never going to happen. Even the date of the election was conceded to the Tories.
We then reach the last furlong. I believe too much damage had been done through incompetence and internal wrangling to expect a Labour victory. A hung Parliament was just about possible though. It depended on campaigning successfully on the biggest issue of the past forty years. The lines of attack were obvious. Johnson had failed to deliver Brexit by the 31 October. He had cobbled together a very bad withdrawal agreement for political reasons only. His "get Brexit done" slogan was obviously bogus. Surely Labour could make headway?
Labour did not even try. The leadership were, in my opinion, so committed to Lexit that to argue against the Tories would have risked compromising the outcome they secretly desired. They tried to use the NHS to deflect attention. Even this strategy was lacklustre. The threat of US bullying on drugs prices should have been a rallying cry. It turned into another damp squib. However unfair, the press and the BBC were always going to side with Johnson. Labour had to be especially good to counter this inherent bias. The fact that Labour were the opposite of especially good is the reason that no argument they attempted was ever likely to shift the momentum, which was with Johnson. His performances were irksome and clumsy but were still enough to defeat Labour. What is the explanation?
Broadly speaking, the internal divisions within Labour - between the old guard who believed in a hard-left form of socialism and the more progressive, pro-European contingent - led to paralysis. Both message and policy were compromised. For Labour to have done better it would have needed to have provided a compelling narrative that energised every level of the party. A more coherent campaign would have emerged. Patently, this was not the case. In particular, Labour failed in its northern heartlands. Its message on Brexit was so garbled it was not believed by Leavers, who saw Johnson as the pathfinder, nor by Remainers. It was impossible to explain because it made no sense. A clear position, one way or the other, would surely have done better.
It boils down to a more significant question. What is Labour for? If it is not able to articulate this because it has not convinced itself, it is hardly surprising that voters will not be convinced either. Implicit in the Lexit argument is a desire for state intervention. If a party displays its competence by inflicting serious damage on itself by not dealing with anti-Semitism, by concocting an impossible Brexit policy and by failing to oppose a dangerous and deranged right-wing government, people will suspect the same level of competence in terms of state intervention. Voters are not stupid. Unfortunately, by and large, the Labour Party has been.
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