Human Fallibility and Weird Outcomes

Predicting the outcome of Brexit and the election is nearly impossible, according to the pundits. The electorate are volatile and our first-past-the post system amplifies small changes in voting behaviour to produce wild swings. Of course, this does not prevent endless speculation. How will the decline of the Brexit party affect the Leave vote? What will Labour's position on freedom of movement mean for the Remain vote? The answers are usually framed in terms of what whole parties are likely to do. This post takes a different view. What if we look at the human fallibilities of the main players? What outcomes do we then get?

The idea was inspired by watching a TED video on "emergence". This is the phenomenon by which systems can exhibit great complexity by virtue of their constituent parts obeying only a few simple rules. A school of fish, for example.

 

It occurred to me that politicians, when faced with a challenge, use only a few simple rules, just like fish do, to solve the problem. These reactions vary according to their personalities, which we know from observation are flawed. By working out the simple rules they are applying, some strange outcomes are possible.

Boris Johnson

Let us start with Johnson. By following through with this line of reasoning, we can predict that he will eventually bestow upon us the softest of Brexits possible. To understand why we must work out what rules he is using. 

Any observer of Johnson will know that his ultimate ambition is a majority government. That is his primary flaw. A lust for power. The withdrawal agreement he negotiated, it transpired, was nothing more than a stepping stone to winning a majority. He had no interest in the consequences beyond some tactical advantage.

Rule 1: Power is the ultimate goal. Brexit is a passenger.

His main line of attack is to promise certainties. He has promised us, on pain of death, Brexit on the 31 October. He promised noncompliance with the Benn Act. He promised over and over that he would get Brexit done. None of these promises have been kept. What actually happens when Johnson meets a problem is that he takes the path of least resistance. He negotiated a withdrawal agreement with the EU that was the effectively May's deal because it was the easiest thing to do in the time. The fact that it was an awful deal was not a problem to him.

Rule 2: Promises mean nothing. Break them if needed.

The third major flaw in Johnson's make up is laziness. In securing his withdrawal agreement he avoided serious negotiation until he absolutely had to. It was negotiated in record time because he didn't care what it contained. From his after drinks ramblings heard by Northern Irish business people, he clearly had no understanding of what was in the deal. It served a short term purpose, nothing more.

Rule 3: Do the minimum amount of work. No need to think too far ahead.

Applying these rules to the current political situation we can see that Brexit for Johnson is only a minor concern. He wants power above all else. He will promise anything to get the power he craves. He will break any promises that prove inconvenient. He will take the path of least resistance to get what he wants.

How does all this lead to the softest of all possible Brexits? Well, first he wins a majority (Rule 1). He does so by deploying a simple message, that he will get Brexit done. It matters not that Brexit will require years of further negotiation (Rule 2). He will not bother to back up his assertion (Rule 3) because he knows he has the full support of the right-wing media and the opposition are in disarray.

Having won his majority he then has to dispense with Brexit. The withdrawal agreement goes through but he realises, with dismay, he still has to negotiate our future relationship. It dawns on him that if talks are not concluded by the end of 2020, we exit on no-deal terms, which could mean a lot of trouble. Best to put off trouble (Rule 3) so he breaks his promise not to extend the transition period (Rule 2). Having little interest in Brexit, one way or  the other, he now faces the EU negotiating team, who are in a strong position. He already has the power he wants (Rule 1) so agrees to the terms offered, which amount to Brino (Rule 3).

Jeremy Corbyn

We can do the same thing with Jeremy Corbyn. His primary flaw is indecision. In the case of Brexit this derives from his Euroscepticism, which is not the prevailing view of his party. When the party proposed becoming fully Remain he withdrew from the fray to read a book by Harold Wilson, from which he concluded, the best strategy going forward would be to sit on the fence. 

Rule 1: Do not decide unless forced to. Sit on the fence.

We can also observe many occasions on which Corbyn manoeuvred to engineer an outcome close to his real preference, Lexit. He whipped his MPs to trigger Article 50. He whipped against an amendment proposing membership of single market and customs union. He has stubbornly pursued this objective for years.

Rule 2: Aim in direction of Lexit.

The stubbornness evidenced above, is also a flaw. It leads to a rigid, unyielding approach. It might seem at odds with Rule 1, about fence sitting, but even sitting on a fence can be done stubbornly.

Rule 3: Do not give way.

Two recent disasters stem from these rules. During a period of heated parliamentary discourse, proroguing and national tension, a government of national unity (GNU) became highly desirable. Corbyn, with justification, assumed it was his right to become its leader. When this assertion was challenged, he refused to give way (Rule 3). If he had, the possibility of a referendum would have threatened his preference for Lexit (Rule 2). He knew that if he did nothing (Rule 1) the window of opportunity would close. It did and no GNU formed.

The other disaster is Labour's overall Brexit policy. The main culprit is Corbyn and his desire for Lexit (Rule 2), which asserts itself  at various critical moments. There was the conference debacle, where a show of hands was scandalously taken as assent for his policy. The party would otherwise have gone fully Remain. Yet Corbyn could not bring himself to fully endorse his own strategy (Rule 1) leading to the incomprehensible position of him choosing to sit on the fence on the biggest issue of the day.

There are no weird, unpredictable outcomes in the case of Labour. They will do badly - though perhaps not as badly as people think. The rules Corbyn works to nearly always produce confused positioning. In the current climate of disengagement with politics and general dismay with our politicians, this may not seem much worse than anything else that is on offer. He is lucky the Tories are so bad.

Jo Swinson

There has been some talk of what would happen in the case of a hung parliament and whether Labour and the Lib Dems would cooperate. This would be necessary for Labour to negotiate their own deal. We can conclude from the rules that Corbyn would be fully committed to his deal (Rule 2) and would pursue this commitment stubbornly (Rule 3). He would not seek compromise therefore with Swinson. 

For the purposes of this analysis, Swinson can be assumed to be driven primarily by a desire for power. This has been evidenced in her attacks on Corbyn, to establish sufficient distance to attract Tory voters, and in her interventions to prevent her candidates standing down in key marginals. Brexit seems a lesser issue. She has made it plain she will not cooperate with Corbyn. How would this scenario play out?

In short, the two players' rules are incompatible. In the case of a hung parliament there would be intensive horse trading. Corbyn would stubbornly insist on his right to negotiate Lexit and Swinson would stubbornly refuse to cooperate. With time running out before the January deadline, to everyone's surprise (except mine) she would turn to Johnson. His Rule 1 would coincide hers. They would both get what they want. Power.